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Contextual Advertising
Abstract
Contextual advertising entails the display of relevant ads based on the content that consumers
view, exploiting the potential that consumers’ content preferences are indicative of their prod-
uct preferences. This paper studies the strategic aspects of such advertising, considering an
intermediary who has access to a content base, sells advertising space to advertisers who com-
pete in the product market, and provides the targeting technology. The results show that
contextual targeting impacts advertiser profit in two ways: first, advertising through relevant
content topics helps advertisers reach consumers with a strong preference for their product.
Second, heterogeneity in consumers’ content preferences can be leveraged to reduce product
market competition, especially when competition is intense. The intermediary has incentives
to strategically design its targeting technology, sometimes at the cost of the advertisers. When
product market competition is moderate, the intermediary offers accurate targeting such that
the consumers see the most relevant ads. When competition is high, the intermediary lowers
the targeting accuracy such that the consumers see less relevant ads. Doing so intensifies
competition and encourages advertisers to bid for multiple content topics in order to prevent
their competitors from reaching consumers. In some cases, this may lead to an asymmetric
equilibrium where one advertiser bids high even for the content topic that is more relevant to
its competitor.
1 Introduction
“ Google’s toughest search is for a business model... In other words, can Google
create a business model even remotely as good as its technology?” - New York
Times, April 2002
Eight years after the above observation was made, Google’s annual revenue had sur-
passed $20 billion thanks to its immensely successful AdWord search advertising and AdSense
affiliate advertising programmes. Years after the established success of Google, critics are cast-
ing doubts in a similar fashion on the emerging social media sites such as Facebook, YouTube
and Twitter1, questioning their ability to monetize their user base. Once again, advertising
seems to be the answer. YouTube, Facebook and Twitter had all implemented their adver-
tising programmes, and they have become some of the fastest growing advertising outlets on
the Internet.
Why do successful search engines, video sharing websites, micro-blogging sites and
social networks alike embrace advertising as their preferred business model? Other than
their broad reach to Internet users, all the above-mentioned sites have offered contextual
targeting as a major value proposition. Contextual advertising refers to the targeted delivery
of advertisements according to the content each consumer views. Consider an example from
YouTube. A video named ‘park ride’ features a stunt-performing cyclist. Viewers of the
this video in early 2010 saw an overlay flash ad from the bike maker Lynskey, which makes
customized performance bikes. Such accurate targeting is made possible by the wealth of user-
generated videos on YouTube that cover a wide range of topics. Similarly, Google’s AdSense2
network attracts an enormous number of Internet content publishers who wish to monetize
their websites. In early 2010, an ad for Dahon foldable bike was displayed on foldforum.com,
which is a general interest discussion forum for foldable bike lovers. An ad from Organic Bikes,
1For example, see the article “YouTube is Doomed.” http://www.businessinsider.com/is-youtube-doomed-
2009-4
2Google AdSense displays ads on third party publishers’s sites. This program is not the same as Google
AdWords which allows advertisers to bid to appear on Google’s search page. However, the bidding process is
similar as advertisers bid for keywords that are matched to the content provided by the third party publishers.
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a company that sells bicycles made of bamboo, was displayed on the biking advocacy section
of bikeforums.com, a popular gathering spot for environmentally minded city commuters. It
is the heterogeneity in member publishers’ content that allows the AdSense network to choose
the most relevant content and deliver such highly targeted ads.
The idea of targeted advertising has a long history in the advertising industry. Advertis-
ing agencies sometimes offer media planning services to their clients, choosing the advertising
medium (e.g., newspapers or TV channels) according to the type of product being adver-
tised. However, the most exciting developments in contextual advertising have taken place in
the online environment. There are two reasons for this. First, online intermediaries such as
Google AdSense typically boast massively heterogeneous content bases, which can be lever-
aged to deliver finely targeted ads to a large Internet population. In addition, the development
of sophisticated content analysis algorithms has automated the ad-content matching process
and made it possible on a large scale. The goal of this paper is to study the phenomenon of
contextual advertising, focusing on two unique aspects of the ecosystem:
• First, we explicitly model the idea that a consumer’s content preference is indicative of
her product preference. We assume that the consumers browse content and purchase
products. Each consumer’s product preference can be imperfectly inferred from what
content topics she browses. Said differently, consumers’ content preference and product
preference are partially aligned. The advertisers can exploit this alignment - which we
call content relevance - to target the consumers. We examine the link between consumers’
preference structure and the effectiveness of contextual targeting.
• Second, we consider an independent, profit maximizing intermediary. The intermediary
sells advertising spaces via second price auctions and implements the targeting technol-
ogy. For example, Google Adsense relies on content analysis algorithms to determine
the exact content of each webpage in order to deliver the relevant ad. We investigate
the intermediary’s incentives to strategically manipulate targeting accuracy.
We set up an analytical model with horizontally differentiated product firms. In or-
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der for the products to enter consumers’ consideration sets, firms have to communicate their
product information to potential consumers through advertising. Consumers encounter adver-
tising when they browse content and their preferences for different content topics are (to some
extent) correlated with their product preferences. A contextual advertising intermediary de-
livers an ad on each content page using its targeting technology. Firms bid for the advertising
slots associated with different content topics and engage in price competition in the product
market.
In the baseline analysis, we discuss two distinct roles of contextual advertising: first, by
exploiting the alignment between the consumers’ product and content preferences, advertisers
can efficiently reach the consumers who have strong preference for their product. Second,
by exploiting the misalignment between the consumers’ product and content preferences,
advertisers can create a type of ‘informational differentiation’, wherein some consumers only
see one ad for one product although they like both products equally. Consequently, advertiser
profits can either increase or decrease in content relevance, depending on the competitiveness
in the product market.
These results resonate with some of the basic findings from the targeting and individual
marketing literature (Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang 2001, Iyer, Soberman, and Villas-Boas
2005). Our main contribution concerns the role and the strategic motives of the contextual
advertising intermediary. In our model advertisers not only compete in the product market for
consumers, but also compete for advertising space provided by the intermediary. We study the
auctions conducted by the intermediary and the resulting equilibrium allocation of advertising
slots when advertisers bid for the content topics in separate second price auctions.
In a duopoly setup, we find that each firm tends to advertise through the more relevant
content topic as long as product market competition is moderate. When product market
competition is sufficiently high, each firm has a strong incentive to bid for the content topic
that is more relevant to her competitor. In this way, a firm is able to preempt the competitor
from advertising to the consumers who like both products. The incentive of competitive
reduction can be strong enough to lead to a ‘topic shelving’ equilibrium wherein one firm
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advertises through both the relevant content topic and less relevant content topic. This
analysis suggests two distinct drivers of the advertisers willingness to pay for content topics:
(1) to generate additional traffic; and (2) to reduce competition. When reducing competition
is the main objective, an advertiser may have a high willingness to pay for a content topic
that generates little additional traffic.
One of our most important results discusses the intermediary’s optimal choice of tar-
geting accuracy. We find that when product market competition is low, the intermediary
should offer accurate targeting such that the firms can reach distinct, minimally overlapping
audiences by advertising through different content topics. As long as content relevance is not
perfect, the audience of each content topic includes both firms’ strong preference consumers.
Consequently, each advertiser is interested in acquiring as many content topics as possible
since each ad slot brings in additional traffic. This drives up the equilibrium payments in
the second price auction. When product market competition is high, however, the intermedi-
ary should intentionally offer inaccurate targeting technology which decreases the advertisers’
ability to create informational differentiation. This further intensifies price competition and
drives up the firms’ incentives to bid for their competitors’ content topics in order to re-
duce competition. In doing so, the intermediary may endogenously induce the topic shelving
equilibrium which would not have taken place if targeting is accurate.
Extending our basic model, we consider an extension with multiple intermediaries to
analyze how advertisers’ incentives change if there are two alternatives for buying advertising
space in the same topic. We find that in this model with two identical intermediaries, the
results are largely similar to those of our basic model as topic shelving and the non-shelving
outcomes occur in the same parameter regions. However, we find an interesting additional type
of duopoly equilibrium wherein advertisers differentiate in which intermediary they advertise
at. Only in this latter case, are the intermediary profits lower than half of what a single
intermediary would make.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We summarize the related literature and
our relative contribution in Section 2. In Section 3 we present the model and conduct the
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basic analyses in Section 4. We study the intermediary’s strategic choice of targeting accuracy
in Section 5, and consider the presence of multiple intermediaries in Section 6. Finally, we
discuss the practical implications of our results and conclude in Section 7.
2 Related Research
This paper is broadly related to three literature streams. First, our paper is closely related
to the earlier work on the targeting of advertising. Iyer et al. (2005) argue that targeted
advertising can help advertisers mitigate product market competition and increase advertiser
profits in a competitive industry. Similarly, Gal-Or and Gal-Or (2005) consider a setup where
customized advertising is intermediated by a common media distributor. The authors found
that the media distributor can implement monopoly pricing utilizing customized advertising.
More recently, Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) study the differences between offline and online
advertising markets, focusing on the differences in targeting ability. Similar to these articles,
we focus on the competitive implications of contextual advertising, e.g., how contextual tar-
geting help competing advertisers reduce their product market competition3. In addition, we
model three unique institutional details of the contextual advertising market not considered in
this literature. First, contextual advertising relies crucially on the existence of heterogeneous
media content which consumers browse. We explicitly model consumers’ correlated preference
structures for the content and the products, and study content relevance as a key parameter.
Second, we consider the ad space auction process that is typical of many online contextual
advertising platforms. Finally, we consider the strategic choices of the contextual advertising
intermediary that are unique to the contextual advertising industry, such as the provision of
targeting technology. Conceptually, our notion of imperfect contextual targeting is related to
the idea of individual targetability proposed by Chen et al. (2001). They show that adver-
tiser profits may increase or decrease as targetability increases. We obtain a similar result
3Empirically, Dong, Manchanda, and Chintagunta (2009) show that accounting for firms’ strategic behavior
is important in quantifying the benefit of segment-level targeting, thus supporting the focus on competitive
implication in the advertising targeting literature.
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concerning the relevance of content in contextual advertising. Using this result as a building
block, our contribution lies in modeling the entire contextual advertising ecosystem including
an intermediary who has access to the content base and provides the targeting technology. In
addition to determining the allocation of advertising slots for different content topics, we also
uncover the strategic incentives of the intermediary to manipulate targeting accuracy.
Second, our paper is related to the growing literature on keyword auctions (Chen and
He 2011, Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz 2007, Katona and Sarvary 2010, Varian 2007) in
search advertising. Most papers in this stream focus on understanding the properties of the
widely adopted keyword auction mechanism, such as the Generalized Second Price auction.
The auction design used in contextual advertising is essentially identical. Therefore, our model
of ad space auction is built upon the auction mechanisms and solution concept proposed by
Edelman et al. (2007) and Varian (2007). Search advertising can be considered as an extreme
example of contextual advertising, wherein each ’keyword’ can be considered as a ’content
topic’ that is maximally relevant to the product. This paper offers two distinct additions to
the literature. On one hand, we study an environment that is more general and less sterile
than search advertising in that content topic preference do not express interest in specific
products as clearly as search for specific keywords. On the other hand, we address the natural
problem that most advertisers involved in contextual or search advertising face: how much to
bid for different topics when engaging in product market competition with other advertisers?
Aside from a few papers (Sayedi, Jerath, and Srinivasan 2011, Shin 2009) studying the specific
question of bidding for a competitor’s branded keyword in search advertising this problem has
not been explored.
Third, by explicitly considering the contextual advertising intermediary as an indepen-
dent market player, our model is generally related to literature on distributional channels (see
for example Coughlan (1985), Coughlan and Lal (1992)) and, specifically, earlier studies on
commercial media (Dukes 2004, Gal-Or and Dukes 2003, Gal-Or and Gal-Or 2005, Gal-Or,
Geylani, and Yildrim 2012). With this literature, we share the general idea that product firms
can reduce price competition via the differentiation created by other channel players (for ex-
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ample, competing manufacturers can create differentiation by selling through geographically
distant retailers.). Different from these works, we study content relevance, ad space auction
and intermediary strategic decisions that are unique to the contextual advertising industry.
On a technical level, our model of price competition follows the widely adopted formu-
lation by Narasimhan (1988), Varian (1980). Our conceptualization of advertising follows the
informational advertising paradigm, wherein advertising helps a product enter a consumer’s
consideration set (Grossman and Shapiro 1984, Iyer et al. 2005, Nelson 1974).
3 The Model
We consider a market with two horizontally differentiated firms4 offering their products to a
unit mass of consumers. We assume that consumers learn about the existence of the products
through informative advertising such that they do not buy a product unless they are aware of
it. We assume that the potential consumers are primarily Internet users and firms can reach
them while they browse content on the Web. Firms have the option of advertising through
a contextual advertising intermediary. The intermediary delivers targeted ads to consumers
browsing certain content topics on behalf of the advertisers. Consumers are heterogeneous
with respect to the content topics they browse and these preferences may be correlated with
their product preferences.
3.1 Consumers
Product Preferences: We adopt a standard discrete horizontal differentiation model with
three segments (Iyer et al. 2005, Narasimhan 1988, Varian 1980). Each firm has a segment
of consumers who have strong preferences for its product; a third segment prefer the two
products equally and are therefore ‘price shoppers’. Consumers who have strong preferences
for firm i’s product value their preferred product at 1 and the other product at 0. The price
shoppers value both products at 1. We assume a symmetric setup in which the fraction of
4We use the terms ‘firm’ and ‘advertiser’ interchangeably.
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price shoppers is αp, yielding a strong-preference segment of size
1−αp
2
for each firm. That
is 1−αp
2
captures the heterogeneity in consumer product preferences whereas αp essentially
measures the competitiveness of the product market.5
Content Preferences: We assume that there are two different content topics6 on the Internet
that have some relation to the products sold.7 Similarly to the product market, we assume that
consumers have heterogeneous preferences for content: an αc fraction of them browse both
content topics, whereas 1−αc
2
consumers browse exclusively topic 1 and another 1−αc
2
browse
only topic 2. Hence 1−αc
2
captures the heterogeneity in consumers’ content preferences.
Preference Alignment: We assume that a consumer’s interest in a particular content topic
may be indicative of her preference for a particular product. A consumer who only browses
content topic 1 is more likely to have a strong preference for product 1. Formally, we use sij
to measure the number of customers who have a preference for product i and content topic j.
The indices i and j can take the values of 1, 2 and b, where b indicates that a consumer has
positive valuations for both products or that she browses both content topics. For example sb1
is the number of consumers who have positive valuation for both products, but only browse
content topic 1, whereas s2b is the size of the segment that have strong preferences for product
2, but browse both content topics. Collectively, the nine sij values capture the relationship
between consumer preference distribution in the product and content markets. For example,
when consumer preferences for content topics are independent of product preferences, we have
sI11 = s
I
21 = s
I
12 = s
I
22 =
1− αp
2
· 1− αc
2
, sIb1 = s
I
b2 = αp
1− αc
2
,
sI1b = s
I
2b = αc
1− αp
2
, and sIbb = αpαc.
In other words, a consumer’s content preference is totally uninformative of her brand pref-
5We do not assume that consumers who have a positive valuation for a product are necessarily aware
of it. Our interpretation of this preference structure simply intends to capture heterogeneity in consumers’
willingness to pay for different product types (e.g., specifications or features), rather than brand loyalty as
some other papers using the same model do. Our approach is identical to that of Iyer et al. (2005).
6In Section 3 of the Online Appendix, we consider a setting with three different keywords.
7‘Content topics’ could refer to user-generated videos in different categories on Youtube or the different
types of affiliated websites in the AdSense network. These videos or websites have heterogeneous themes and
attract different viewers.
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erence. On the other extreme, when αp = αc = α and the preference for content topics is
perfectly aligned with the preference for products, we have
sA11 = s
A
22 =
1− α
2
, sAbb = α, and s
A
12 = s
A
21 = s
A
b1 = s
A
b2 = s
A
1b = s
A
2b = 0.
Put differently, a consumer is interested in product i if and only if she is interested in content
topic i. Thus, a consumer’s content preference is maximally informative about her brand
preference. When αp 6= αc, product and content preferences cannot be perfectly aligned, since
different percentages of consumers are interested in both products than in both content topics.
We define maximally aligned product and content preferences, using
sA11 = s
A
22 = min
(
1− αc
2
,
1− αp
2
)
, sAbb = min(αp, αc), s
A
b1 = s
A
b2 =
max(αp − αc, 0)
2
,
sA1b = s
A
2b =
max(αc − αp, 0)
2
, and sA12 = s
A
21 = 0.
To simplify notation and measure alignment between product and content preferences using a
single parameter, we introduce ρ and place constraints on the possible values of sij as follows:
sij = (1− ρ)sIij + ρsAij. (1)
When ρ = 0, content and product preferences are independent, whereas when ρ = 1, they are
maximally aligned.
Browsing and Clicking Behavior: In order for a product to enter a consumer’s consider-
ation set, the consumer needs to receive an ad for this product. As in Iyer et al. (2005), the
consumers’ product preferences can be considered as their endowed preferences over product
attributes; but the consumers do not know the available options in the market. Advertising
informs the consumers about the existence of the products and their attributes.
We assume that each consumer browses N webpages on the content topic(s) she is
interested in. Each time a consumer browses a page, she sees an ad and clicks on it if she has
positive valuation for the product featured in that ad.8 Thus, a consumer’s content preference
8We do not formally model the utility a consumer can expect from clicking on an ad. The assumption that
a consumer always clicks when her valuation is positive seems rather strong, but an alternative formulation in
which consumers click with a certain (fixed) probability yields similar results.
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determines which pages she will browse. A consumer’s product preferences determine which
ads she will click on conditional on seeing them. For example, a consumer who is interested in
both products will click on both ads if she sees them. However, she may not have the chance
to click on a product’s ad if it is never displayed on any of the N pages she browses. Which
ad will be displayed on a content page depends on the outcome of the ad auction process and
the intermediary’s targeting technology, which we explain in the next subsection.
We assume that each firm can also reach the consumers through an ‘outside’ medium,
such as TV, newspaper, or online channels other than what the contextual ad intermediary
offers. For simplicity, we assume that a γ fraction of consumers follow this outside medium
and that both firms advertise through it. This guarantees that each firm will always stay in
the market even without advertising through the contextual advertising intermediary.
3.2 Advertisers and the Intermediary
Advertisers bid for the ad slots associated with different content topics in separate second price
auctions.9 If a firm is the highest bidder for a content topic, the intermediary promises to de-
liver that firm’s ad on each content page belonging to that topic. However, the intermediary’s
targeting technology can be imperfect.
Ad Delivery and Targeting Technology: Suppose that firm 1 wins the ad slot for content
topic 1 and firm 2 wins the ad slot for content topic 2. The intermediary is responsible for
displaying firm 1’s ad on every content page that belongs to topic 1. However, the intermediary
can only achieve this objective imperfectly. Each time a consumer browses a webpage in
content topic 1, there is a ϑ probability that she will (correctly) see the ad for product 1;
with probability 1 − ϑ she will (incorrectly) see the ad for product 2. More generally, 1 − ϑ
denotes the probability that the intermediary makes a mistake, in which case it displays an
ad intended for content topic i on a page that is actually in content topic j. Clearly, ϑ = 1
represents the case of a perfect targeting technology, while ϑ = 1
2
represents a case of totally
9In the basic model, we assume there is one advertising slot on each content page. We present analysis
with multiple ad-slots in Section 2 of the Online Appendix.
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ineffective targeting technology. We assume that the probability of mismatching is identical
and independent across the webpages. Clearly, when a consumer browses N pages in her
preferred content area, she has a 1 − ϑN chance of seeing a ‘incorrect’ ad intended to be
displayed for the other content topic.
In the case of AdSense, Google involves a large number of web pages in its content
network. AdSense relies on sophisticated content analysis algorithms to infer the content
topic of each page. ϑ essentially denotes the probability that the algorithm will correctly infer
each page’s content. If the algorithm makes an incorrect inference, an irrelevant ad may be
displayed. This does not happen if ϑ = 1, whereas ϑ = 1
2
would mean that Google randomly
assigns ads to pages.
Content Topic (i.e., Ad Slot) Auction: We consider a second price Pay-per-click (PPC)
auction with click-through rate (CTR) correction, which is the most standard format used
in the industry. The intermediary runs an auction where each advertiser submits a bid for
each content topic separately, and bids are corrected for expected CTRs when determining
the winner.10
Equilibrium Concept: To solve the advertising space auction, we extend the so-called envy-
free equilibrium concept (Edelman et al. 2007, Varian 2007) to multiple items. This type of
equilibrium is a widely used concept for sponsored link auctions. The basic idea is that when
a bidder considers deviating from her equilibrium strategies, and possibly acquiring a different
slot, she evaluates the deviation by using the price that is currently paid for that slot. This
is a stronger condition for profitable deviations than in a simple Nash equilibrium as the
currently paid price may be higher than what the deviating bidder will eventually pay due to
the possible change in order. Thus, the set of envy-free (or symmetric) equilibria is a subset
of the Nash-equilibria. We generalize this concept to a setting with simultaneous auctions for
10Specifically, the intermediary determines the winner by ranking PPCi ∗CTRi. Suppose PPCi ∗CTRi >
PPC−i ∗ CTR−i. Then the winning advertiser i will pay the adjusted second price PPC−i∗CTR−iCTRi for each
click she receives. In total, she will pay PPC−i ∗CTR−i. This is the auction procedure used by many online
contextual advertising intermediaries, such as Google AdSense. When click-through rates can be perfectly
estimated, bidding by PPC is equivalent to bidding by impression.
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multiple items (in this case advertising slots). Specifically, in any envy-free equilibrium, each
bidder considers deviations that entail acquiring or giving up a set of advertising slots at the
sum of their current prices11. As is common in the literature, we evaluate auctioneer profit
based on the minimal-revenue envy-free equilibrium.
Pricing: Firms inform their consumers through both contextual advertising and the ‘outside’
advertising medium. Once consumers learn about the products, firms set prices and consumers
purchase. We normalize the marginal cost of production to zero.
3.3 Timing
To summarize, we present the key model parameters in Table 1 and describe the timing below:
1. Intermediary Strategy: the intermediary makes strategic decisions such as targeting
precision (ϑ).
2. Advertising Slot Allocation: The contextual advertising intermediary organizes second-
price auctions to allocate the advertising slots associated with each content topic to the
advertisers.
3. Browsing and Advertising: The ads are delivered based on the auction results. Con-
sumers browse the content pages they are interested in and see/click on the ads.
4. Pricing: Advertisers set prices for their products.
5. Purchasing: Consumers make purchase decisions and profits are realized.
4 Analysis
To use backward induction, we start by determining the equilibrium advertiser revenues in
the subgame where each firm advertises through the more relevant content topic (i.e., firm i
11Although the auction involves multiple items, we do not consider the possibility of combinatorial auctions.
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Parameter Interpretation
Consumer Preference
αp Product market competitiveness
αc Content preference homogeneity
ρ Content relevance
Intermediary choice
ϑ Targeting accuracy
Browsing & Outside media
N Number of pages browsed
γ Outside media coverage
Table 1: Summary of Model Parameters
advertises to and only to the consumers who browse content topic i). In order to determine
equilibrium prices, we need to count the consumers who only consider one product and those
who compare prices. The solution of such a pricing game is well known in the literature
(Narasimhan 1988, Varian 1980) with firms employing symmetric mixed strategies. Each
firm’s profit equals to the number of consumers who only consider a single product. In
our model, a consumer will consider only a single product either because she has a strong
preference for that product or because she is only aware of that product. By evaluating the
sizes of the different consumer segments, we obtain the following expressions for advertiser
revenues:12
Πd = (1− γ)Sc + γ 1− αp
2
(2)
where Sc is defined as follows:
Sc = (1−(1−ϑ)N)s11+(1−ϑN(1−ϑ)N)s1b+(1−ϑN)s12+(1−ϑ)Nsb2+ϑNsb1+ϑN(1−ϑ)Nsbb (3)
The first term in Equation 2 represents the profit from the consumers who do not browse the
‘outside’ media. The firms can reach these consumers only through contextual advertising. A
fraction Sc of these consumers will only consider buying product 1, where:
• s11, s1b and s12 are those consumers who have strong preferences for product 1. These
consumers will purchase product 1 as long as they learn about it. Due to imperfect
12The details are provided in the proof of Lemma 1.
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targeting technology, these consumers will learn about product 1 with probability 1 −
(1 − ϑ)N if they only browse content topic 1. They will learn about product 1 with
probability 1− ϑN if they only browse content topic 2. When they browse both content
topics, they learn about product 1 with probability 1− ϑN(1− ϑ)N .
• sb2, sb1 and sbb represent those consumers who prefer both products equally. Some of
them will only see the ad for product 1 and therefore will only consider product 1. For
example, sb1 consumers will only browse content topic 1 and a ϑ
N fraction of them will
only see product 1’s ad. sbb consumers will browse both content topics, but some of
them will only see one ad due to imperfect targeting technology.
Equations 2 and 3 reveal two distinct roles of contextual advertising. First, by adver-
tising through relevant content, an advertiser can efficiently reach the consumers who have
strong preferences for its product (s11, s1b and s12). Second, contextual advertising creates
‘informational differentiation’ in addition to any pre-existing product market differentiation.
Although some consumers may equally prefer the advertisers’ products, they have heteroge-
neous preferences for content topics. These consumers will consider only a single product if
they have only seen ads for that product. The sb2, sb1 and sbb terms in Equation 3 correspond
to these consumers. In other words, the advertisers can leverage the differentiation in the
content market to reduce price competition in the product market.
An interesting tension exists between the two roles of contextual advertising. Consider
the case where each firm advertises through the more relevant content topic. For the purpose
of reaching strong preference consumers, greater alignment between the consumers’ product
and content preferences is needed. When content is more relevant (ρ is higher), it is more
likely that the consumers who have strong preferences for a firm’s product will also browse the
corresponding content topic. Interestingly, however, informational differentiation is created
precisely when product preferences are not totally aligned with content preferences. In the
case where a consumer is interested in brand i if and only if she is interested in content topic
i, all the consumers who are interested in both products will also browse both content topics,
15
and are likely to receive both ads.
To summarize, highly relevant content enhances the advertisers’ ability to reach their
strong-preference consumers, but reduces their ability to create informational differentiation.
Depending on which effect is dominant, the advertiser revenues may either increase or decrease
in content relevance ρ. Formally:
Lemma 1 Suppose each advertiser acquires the content topic that is more relevant to its
product. Then advertiser revenues are increasing in ρ iff min(αp, αc) <
ϑN−(1−ϑ)N
3ϑN+3(1−ϑ)N−6ϑN (1−ϑ)N .
Otherwise, revenues are decreasing in ρ.
When consumers have heterogeneous product preferences as well as heterogeneous content
preferences (αp and αc are small), advertiser profits increase in preference alignment. However,
when there is a high enough proportion of consumers who are interested in both products or
a high proportion interested in both content topics, higher alignment between consumers’
product and content preferences actually reduces advertiser revenues.
In the former case, the majority of consumers have strong preferences for one of the
products. Since competition is low, creating additional differentiation is less of a concern.
Advertiser revenues increase as they become more effective in reaching their strong preference
segments. In the latter case, consumer preferences are homogeneous and the need to create
informational differentiation dominates. Consequently, advertiser revenues decrease in ρ. The
above results are illustrated in Figure 1.
We shall point out that the above results resonate with the findings in Chen et al.
(2001), where targeted pricing can either increase or decrease profits due to the trade-off be-
tween better price discrimination and intensified competition. Although our results concern
targeted informational advertising, the two models share a number of mathematical similari-
ties. We refer interested readers to the appendices of both papers.
The above analysis sheds light on how contextual advertising impacts advertisers’ prof-
its. It focuses on the subgame where each firm advertises through the more relevant content
topics. We next examine the advertisers’ bidding strategies and the equilibrium allocation of
16
Figure 1: Decomposing Advertiser Revenue
content topics.
Proposition 1 (Content Topic Allocation and Intermediary Revenue) The equilibrium
content topic allocation is described by the following conditions:
• Each advertiser gets the more relevant content topic when αp ≤ αp(αc, ρ, ϑ,N, γ). The
intermediary’s revenue is
Rd = 2(1−γ)(αp+(1−ϑ)Ns11+ϑNs12+ϑN(1−ϑ)Ns1b−(ϑN+(1−ϑ)N)sb1−ϑN(1−ϑ)Nsbb)
• When αp > αp(αc, ρ, ϑ,N, γ), one advertiser gets both content topics in the contextual
advertising medium; the other advertiser only advertises through the outside media. The
intermediary’s revenue is
Rm =
(1− γ)(1 + αp − 2αpγ)
2
.
The threshold αp(αc, ρ, ϑ,N, γ) is uniquely defined as the solution of
1 + (1 + 2γ)αp + 4(1− ϑ)N(s11 − sb1) + 4ϑN(s12 − sb2) + 4ϑN(1− ϑ)N(s1b − sbb)
2(1− αp) = 1
where sij = sij(αp, αc, ρ) are the corresponding segment sizes.
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Proposition 1 establishes two qualitatively different market outcomes. When product market
competition is low (i.e., αp is small), each advertiser wins the more relevant content topic.
When product market competition is high (i.e., αp is large such that sb∗ is large), however,
one firm will get both content topics in equilibrium. We refer to this latter outcome as
the ‘topic shelving’ equilibrium. Since advertising through both content topics prevents the
competitor from delivering its product information to some of the consumers, ‘topic shelving’
can be considered as a mean to reduce product market competition13. When competition is
sufficiently intense, firm i may have a higher willingness to pay than firm −i for content topic
−i. ‘Topic shelving’ takes place as a consequence.
Proposition 1 also reveals two distinct determinants of intermediary revenue. Since the
advertising slots are sold via second price auctions, the equilibrium payment to each content
topic equals the second highest bid. When each firm advertises through the more relevant
content topic, the equilibrium payment equals firm −i’s willingness to pay for content topic
i. Firm i has two incentives to acquire content topic −i. First, firm i can generate additional
demand by informing the consumers who browse pages in topic −i but not in topic i. Second,
firm i can reduce the pressure for price competition by ensuring that the consumers do not see
firm −i’s ad. The equilibrium second price bid can thus be decomposed into two parts: the
willingness to pay for additional traffic and the willingness to pay for competition reduction.
To see this decomposition formally, consider the extreme case of ϑ = 1. Firm 1’s willingness
to bid for content topic 2 corresponds to (1 − γ)1+αp
2
− (1 − γ)Sc = (1 − γ)(s12 + sb2 + sbb).
The component s12 + sb2 represents the consumers who are interested in firm 1’s product, but
do not browse any pages in content topic 1. Therefore, firm 1 can inform these consumers
(i.e., generate additional traffic) by advertising through content topic 2. The component sbb
corresponds to the consumers who learn about both products when both firms advertise.
These consumers have already learned about firm 1’s product since they browse pages in
content topic 1. However, since they also learn about firm 2’s product, the firms have to
13Due to the existence of the outside media, a firm can not completely block its competitor out of the market.
However, each firm is able to marginally reduce product market competition by preventing its competitor from
advertising through the contextual ad intermediary.
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compete for these consumers in price. When firm 1 advertises through both content topics,
these consumers will only learn about product 1. Thus, (s12 + sb2) corresponds to firm 1’s
willingness to pay for additional traffic and sbb corresponds to firm 1’s willingness to pay for
competition reduction.
The above decomposition has some interesting implications. For example, a firm may
be willing to pay more for a content topic as it gets fewer unique click-throughs from that
content topic. When αp and ϑ are both high, firm i has a higher willingness to pay for content
topic −i as αc gets higher. Higher αc implies greater overlap between the content topics, and
firm i gets less additional traffic from advertising through topic −i. However, bidding for
topic −i does help prevent the competitor from advertising. In fact, the need for competition
reduction is stronger for higher αc, since overlap in the content topics’ audiences imply a larger
sbb segment and tougher product market competition.
The intermediary wants to design its targeting service so as to maximize the second
price bids. Depending on the consumers’ product and content preferences, the intermediary
may pursue distinct strategies that focus on either maximizing the advertisers’ willingness to
pay for additional traffic or their willingness to pay for competition reduction. We elaborate
on these results in Section 5.
The results on ‘topic shelving’ resonate with the empirical observations presented in
Shin (2009), who observed that in some product categories advertisers will bid for their com-
petitor’s brand name, which is arguably the most relevant ‘content topic’ for that firm. Sim-
ilarly, we observe a plethora of ‘keyword spying’ services emerging on the Internet during the
recent years 14. These companies provide their clients with technologies that analyze the ad
space bidding behavior of their product market competitors. Some keyword spying companies
even provide consulting services on what is the best bidding strategy to win these ad spaces
from a competitor. There are multiple reasons why an advertiser might be interested in her
competitor’s content topic. Our analysis suggests that competitive reduction might be one
explanation.
14See for example keycompete.com, spyfu.com, or keywordspy.com
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5 Intermediary Strategy: Optimal Targeting Accuracy
In this section, we take the intermediary’s perspective and consider the endogenous choice
of ϑ. Recall from Section 3 that ϑ represents the probability that the intermediary delivers
the right ad each time a consumer browses a content page. When ϑ = 1, the intermediary
correctly determines the content category of every single page and delivers the corresponding
ad. When ϑ < 1, the intermediary may incorrectly classify a page in content topic i as one in
content topic −i. As a consequence, the intermediary may deliver an ad which is not intended
for that page. To highlight the link between targeting accuracy and intermediary revenue, we
focus on the simple case where the choice of ϑ is costless. Proposition 2 describes this result.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Targeting Technology) When the choice of ϑ is costless, the
intermediary’s optimal15 decision can be characterized as follows:
• When αp ≤ α̂p(αc, ρ,N, γ), the intermediary develops the most accurate targeting tech-
nology ϑ∗ = 1.
• When αp > α̂p(αc, ρ,N, γ), the intermediary provides the least accurate targeting tech-
nology ϑ∗ = 1
2
.
The threshold α̂p(αc, ρ,N, γ) is implicitly defined as the solution of
ŝ12 − ŝb1 − ŝ11
2N
− ŝ12
2N
− ŝ1b
4N
+
2ŝb1
2N
+
ŝbb
4N
= 0
where ŝij = sij(α̂p, αc, ρ) are the corresponding segment sizes.
For sufficiently large N , the condition stated in the proposition converges to s21 > sb1. This
condition is more likely to be satisfied when market competition is low and content relevance is
15For sufficiently high αp, topic shelving takes place and the intermediary is indifferent between a range of
ϑ. Technically, Proposition 2 covers these cases as well since the intermediary weakly prefers ϑ∗ = 12 or ϑ
∗ = 1
when shelving takes place. We detail the relationship between intermediary choice and market outcome in
Corollary 1.
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low. In this case, the intermediary should offer an accurate targeting technology. When com-
petition is high or content relevance is high, the intermediary has incentives to intentionally
decrease targeting accuracy.
The above results can be best understood in light of the willingness-to-pay decompo-
sition provided in Section 4. Consider the case where each firm advertises through the more
relevant content topic. Recall that the equilibrium second price bids can be decomposed into
a willingness to pay for additional traffic and a willingness to pay for competition reduction.
When market competition is low, the intermediary should design its targeting technology to
maximize advertisers’ willingness to pay for additional traffic. This is achieved by offering
accurate targeting, in which case those consumers who only browse content topic 2 are un-
likely to receive firm 1’s ad. As a consequence, firm 1 has to bid for content topic 2 in order
to reach these consumers. This effect is particularly strong when consumers’ content and
product preferences are not highly aligned, such that many consumers who browse content
topic 2 indeed have strong preferences for firm 1’s product.
When product market competition is high, the intermediary should focus on increasing
the advertisers’ willingness to pay for competition reduction. To achieve this goal, the inter-
mediary decreases the targeting accuracy in order to further intensify the competition between
the advertisers. When targeting accuracy is low, consumers who only browse one content topic
will likely see the ‘wrong’ ad and learn about both products. This diminishes informational
differentiation and intensifies competition, which leads to higher willingness to pay for com-
petition reduction. In fact, when αp is sufficiently high, the intermediary may intentionally
decrease ϑ such that topic shelving takes place in equilibrium. Corollary 1 summarizes the in-
teraction between the intermediary’s optimal choice and the equilibrium allocation of content
topics.
Corollary 1 As αp increases from 0 to 1, we have the following scenarios:
• When αp is small, the intermediary offers accurate targeting technology. Each advertiser
advertises through the more relevant content topic.
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• As αp increases, the intermediary offers inaccurate targeting technology. Each advertiser
advertises through the more relevant content topic.
• As αp further increases, each advertiser will advertise through the more relevant content
topic if targeting is accurate. However, the intermediary decreases ϑ such that topic
shelving takes place in equilibrium.
• When αp is sufficiently large, topic shelving takes place regardless of the intermediary’s
choice of ϑ.
Figure 2 illustrates the results for two sets of parameter values. As expected, when
product market competition is sufficiently high, topic shelving takes place regardless of the
intermediary’s choice. The intermediary is indifferent between different levels of ϑ. On the
other extreme, when product market competition is low, each firm advertises through the
more relevant topic regardless of the intermediary’s choice. The intermediary may offer either
accurate or inaccurate targeting depending on parameters, as explained in Proposition 2.
Interestingly, when αp is an intermediate region, the market outcome depends on the
intermediary’s choice of ϑ. Each advertiser will get the more relevant content topic when
targeting is accurate, but topic shelving will take place when it is inaccurate. We find that in
this parameter region the intermediary should indeed decrease targeting accuracy and induce
the topic shelving outcome. The intermediary makes higher profits by selling both content
topics to the same advertiser.
Finally, we present a comparative statics result on how content relevance (ρ) impacts
intermediary profit, given that the intermediary chooses the optimal targeting accuracy. Al-
though ρ is not a decision variable for the intermediary, it is important to know how the
equilibrium profits depend on different values of topic relevance. This might influence the
intermediary’s decision to introduce its services in certain markets depending on whether con-
tent and product preferences are aligned. Corollary 2 reveals that the parameter region in
which intermediary profit is increasing in ρ coincide with the region in which the intermediary
chooses accurate targeting technology ϑ∗ = 1.
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Figure 2: Intermediary choice and content topic allocation: (I) ϑ∗ = 1, each firm advertises
through the more relevant topic. (II) ϑ∗ = 1
2
, each firm advertises through the more relevant
topic. (III) ϑ∗ = 1
2
, topic shelving is induced. (IV) topic shelving takes place regardless of
intermediary choice
Corollary 2 Consider the parameter region in which topic shelving does not take place. When
ϑ∗ = 1, intermediary profit is decreasing in content relevance. When ϑ∗ = 1
2
, intermediary
profit is increasing in content relevance.16
This result should also be understood in light of the willingness to pay decomposition
in Section 4. The equilibrium ϑ∗ = 1 corresponds to the case where market competition is
relatively low such that the intermediary focuses on maximizing the advertisers’ willingness to
pay for additional traffic. Firm 1 has a higher willingness to pay for content topic 2 when s12
is larger, such that advertising through topic 2 attracts firm 1’s strong preference consumers
who would otherwise not see firm 1’s ad. This corresponds to a low ρ. When product market
competition is high, the intermediary focuses on maximizing the advertisers willingness to pay
for competition reduction. As the intermediary chooses ϑ∗ = 1
2
, it follows from Lemma 1 that
advertiser competition will further intensify as ρ increases, as long as min(αp, αc) > 0. Thus,
their willingness to pay is also increasing in ρ.
16Note that when ρ changes, the optimal intermediary choice may also change. We thus consider a fixed
level of ρ and investigate how the intermediary profits changes locally.
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6 Multiple Intermediaries
Throughout the paper we assumed that the intermediary is a monopolist. In this section we
examine the basic forces that are at play when firms have the option of advertising through
two very similar intermediaries. Since the model becomes substantially more complex by
making this change, we make certain simplifying assumptions to obtain a basic understanding
of advertiser incentives and equilibrium bids. We do not explore the otherwise interesting
questions of how intermediaries compete for publishers and how they choose targeting accuracy
under competition.
We assume that there are two identical intermediaries A and B, each of them offering
ad space for two topics. They organize four auctions in total; for topics A1, A2, B1, B2, where
topic A1 is browsed by the same consumers as B1 and A2 by the same consumers as B2. As
before, ρ measures how much the pair of topics (A1,A2) is aligned with product preferences
(which will be the same for B1,B2). We assume that there is no outside option to reach
consumers (γ = 0) and targeting accuracy is perfect (ϑ = 1) for both intermediaries. The four
auctions are run simultaneously and we employ the same generalized envy-free equilibrium
as in the basic model. As before, there are multiple equilibria, but the parameters uniquely
determine the pattern of topic allocations between the two advertisers.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium topic allocations are the following for 0 < ρ < 1:
1. One advertiser gets all content topics iff 1 ≥ αp ≥ αp where
αp = αp(αc, ρ) = max
(
1
3
, 1− 2
3
· αc
(αc + ρ(1/3− αc))/ρ
)
is increasing in ρ and decreasing in αc.
2. Each advertiser gets the most relevant content topic at both intermediaries iff
αp ≥ αp ≥ αp where
αp = αp(αc, ρ) = min
(
1
3
, 1− 2
3
· 1− αc
1− αc − ρ(1/3− αc))/ρ
)
is decreasing in ρ and increasing in αc.
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3. One advertiser gets both content topics at one intermediary, and the other gets both
content topics at the other intermediary iff αp ≥ αp ≥ 0.
The proposition identifies three types of equilibria. The first two cases exactly match the two
equilibrium types in Proposition 1. In the first case, which we call monopoly shelving, one firm
acquires the right to advertise for all topics and becomes a monopolist in the product market.
As before, we get this equilibrium, when the market is competitive enough, that is, when
αp and αc are relatively high with weakly aligned product and content preferences. In the
second type of equilibrium, matching our previous results, firms differentiate in which topic
they advertise for and they each acquire the more relevant content topic at each intermediary.
Interestingly, we find that a third, new type of, equilibrium emerges as the market competi-
tiveness reaches its lowest levels. In this case, each firm gets both the more and less relevant
topics to maximize their reach, but at different intermediaries. We call this outcome ‘duopoly
shelving’. The reason this happens is that firms can take advantage of the extra coverage
that the less relevant topic provides as long as the product market is not very competitive
(αp is low). This is especially true when the topics are not much aligned as the less relevant
topic might provide valuable consumers. In the extreme case, when topics are independent of
product preferences firms are indifferent between this and the second type of outcome.
Comparing our results to the case when there is only one intermediary (Proposition
1), we can nicely match the types of equilibria. Topic shelving happens in the exact same
parameter region, the difference is in the duopoly outcomes. In this way our original parameter
region where the duopoly outcome was the equilibrium in Proposition 1 will be split between
the two types of duopoly outcomes. An important question is how intermediary revenues
change in these regions when we introduce a second intermediary. Since there are multiple
equilibria and the actual payments and bids differ, we need to select a representative one. We
already explained why we focus on the minimum revenue equilibrium that gives advertisers the
highest surplus. To pin down the individual intermediary revenues, we assume that since the
two intermediaries are symmetric (as are topic allocations with respect to the intermediaries)
they make the same profits.
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Corollary 3 In the duopoly shelving case the total minimum revenue of the intermediaries is
lower than if there was only one intermediary. Otherwise, the total revenues are the same.
This result tells us that, with the exception of duopoly shelving, the intermediaries split
the same revenue that a single intermediary covering the entire market would make. They
do so because since both intermediaries use auctions to allocate their slots, traditional price
competition is not present. The only exception is the case of duopoly shelving when advertisers
exploit the possibility of each covering the entire market by using the two intermediaries. In
this case, when the product market is not very competitive and topics are not much aligned
with product preferences, intermediary revenues will be slightly lower.
Although we did not study the competitive choice of targeting accuracy, our results
allow us to speculate about the nature of the competition. One could reach the conclusion that
when one intermediary offers better targeting accuracy, advertisers would be more aggressive
to bid for topics at that intermediary. This may be true to some extent, but our duopoly
shelving equilibrium suggests that advertisers do not always have an incentive to fight for the
best single topic. Rather, they can get both topics to cover the market, suggesting that the
quality competition between intermediaries would be relatively soft, leading to not very high
targeting accuracies.
7 Conclusion
We study contextual advertising, a business model that is being embraced by many success-
ful user-generated content websites, social networking communities and affiliated advertising
networks as the preferred means to monetize their vast content base. We focus on the idea
that advertising targeting helps competing firms reduce their product market price competi-
tion, and discuss the implications for advertisers as well as contextual ad intermediaries. Our
analysis reveals the importance of content relevance and targeting accuracy, and shows that
targeting through more relevant content is not always beneficial for the advertisers. Compet-
ing advertisers have incentives to bid for less relevant content topics in order to preempt a
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competitor from reaching the consumers. The intermediary has an incentive to intentionally
lower targeting accuracy at the expense of the advertisers.
Our results have important implications for both advertisers who wish to take advan-
tage of contextual advertising and intermediaries who provide contextual ad services. It is
crucial for advertisers to understand the competitive effects of advertising, especially when
advertising through imperfectly relevant content. By uncovering the forces that govern the
profitability of contextual advertising we offer guidelines to advertisers in how to bid for each
slot and when it is better to settle for only the more relevant topic rather than to preemp-
tively acquire advertising slots across all the different topics. Intermediaries also have an
important role in this ecosystem. Clearly their choice of targeting technology is influenced by
many factors from cost to technical feasibility and we do not model many of these. Neverthe-
less, intermediaries should understand the competitive implication of targeting accuracy, and
choose to focus on either creating additional traffic or reducing informational differentiation,
depending on the competitiveness of the product market.
The contextual advertising industry is a fast evolving sector with many exciting de-
velopments. Our stylized model takes a first step towards understanding this phenomenon,
leaving many interesting questions to future research. First, many contextual advertising
networks, including AdSense, rely on independent publishers to provide their content base.
The intermediary operates a two-sided market where both advertisers and content publishers
participate. Many Adsense publishers – particularly bloggers and small websites – are con-
stantly tuning their content in order to improve their Adsense income. The potential conflict
of interests between content publishers and intermediary is an interesting question for future
research. In Section 1 of the Online Appendix, we provide some initial analysis about strategic
publishers. We consider a case where the intermediary shares ad revenue with independent
content publishers, and the publishers can optimize their content in order to maximize ad
income. The results describe the optimal content structure the publishers would choose. We
show that the intermediary is more likely to offer accurate targeting technology in the presence
of strategic publishers. Second, despite the immense popularity of the AdSense-type content
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analysis algorithm, many alternative means are being developed to match ads with the rele-
vant online content. For example, the ADSDAQ ad exchange sets up an open market where
individual publishers can directly sell the ad space on their websites to advertisers. Such open
markets exploit the private information each player holds, and may provide better matching
than even the most sophisticated page analysis algorithm. Third, contextual targeting can be
complemented by other forms of targeted ad delivery. While Google has become the dominant
provider of traditional contextual advertising service, social media sites such as Facebook are
offering innovative services that combine contextual targeting, demographic targeting and be-
havioral targeting. How different targeting methods interact poses an interesting yet complex
question. We believe that these issues provide fruitful avenues for future research.
References
Bergemann, Dirk, A. Bonatti. 2011. Targeting in advertising markets: Implications for offline
vs. online media. Rand Journal of Economics 42 417–443.
Chen, Y., C. He. 2011. Paid placement: Advertising and search on the Internet. The Economic
Journal forthcoming.
Chen, Y., C. Narasimhan, Z.J. Zhang. 2001. Individual marketing with imperfect targetability.
Marketing Science 20(1) 23–41.
Coughlan, A.T. 1985. Competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice: Theory and
application. Marketing Science 110–129.
Coughlan, A.T., R. Lal. 1992. Retail pricing: Does channel length matter? Managerial and
Decision Economics 13(3) 201–214.
Dong, X., P. Manchanda, P.K. Chintagunta. 2009. Quantifying the benefits of individual-level
targeting in the presence of firm strategic behavior. Journal of Marketing Research 46(2)
207–221.
Dukes, A. 2004. The Advertising Market in a Product Oligopoly. Journal of Industrial
Economics 52(3) 327–348.
Edelman, B., M. Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz. 2007. Internet advertising and the generalized second-
price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. The American Economic
Review 242–259.
28
Gal-Or, E., A. Dukes. 2003. Minimum differentiation in commercial media markets. Journal
of Economics & Management Strategy 12(3) 291–325.
Gal-Or, Esther, Mordechai Gal-Or. 2005. Customized advertising via a common media dis-
tributor. Marketing Science 24(2) 241–253.
Gal-Or, Esther, T. Geylani, T. P. Yildrim. 2012. The impact of advertising on media bias.
Journal of Marketing Research 49(1) 92–99.
Grossman, G.M., C. Shapiro. 1984. Informative advertising with differentiated products. The
Review of Economic Studies 51(1) 63–81.
Iyer, G., D. Soberman, M. Villas-Boas. 2005. The targeting of advertising. Marketing Science
24(3) 461.
Katona, Zsolt, Miklos Sarvary. 2010. The race for sponsored links: Bidding patterns for search
advertising. Marketing Science 29(2) 199–215.
Narasimhan, C. 1988. Competitive promotional strategies. Journal of Business 61(4) 427–449.
Nelson, P. 1974. Advertising as information. Journal of Political economy 82(4).
Sayedi, Amin, Kinshuk Jerath, Kannan Srinivasan. 2011. Competitive Poaching in Sponsored
Search Advertising and Strategic Impact on Traditional Advertising. working paper .
Shin, W. 2009. The Company that You Keep: When to Buy a Competitors Keyword. working
paper .
Varian, H.R. 1980. A model of sales. The American Economic Review 70(4) 651–659.
Varian, H.R. 2007. Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization 25(6)
1163–1178.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider the case where each firm advertises through one content
topic. The consumers will either consider one of the products or consider both products
depending on their product preferences and which ads they receive. Assume S consumers
will only consider one product while R consumers will consider both firms’ product. From
Narasimhan (1988), the pricing equilibrium has both firms playing mixed strategies in the
interval
[
S
R+S
, 1
]
. The equilibrium profits are S for each firm. Let S = Sc+So where Sc refers
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to the consumers who learn about the product through contextual advertising and So refers
to the consumers who learn about the products through the outside media. We determine the
size of Sc first by considering each of the sij segment in turn:
• s11: these consumers will consider only product 1 as long as they see ad 1 at least once.
Since each time a consumer browses a page in content topic 1 there is a 1−ϑ probability
that she will see the wrong ad (for product 2), the probability that a consumer from
s11 will miss ad 1 is (1− ϑ)N . Thus (1− (1− ϑ)N)s11 consumers will see ad 1 and only
consider product 1.
• s1b: these consumers will consider only product 1 as long as they see ad 1 at least once.
Each consumer from this segment browses N pages in content topic 1 and N pages in
content topic 2. The probability that she misses ad 1 for 2N times is ϑN(1−ϑ)N . Thus
(1− ϑN(1− ϑ)N)s1b consumers will see ad 1 and only consider product 1.
• s12: Similarly, 1 − ϑN of these consumers will see ad 1 at least once and will therefore
consider only product 1.
• sb1: These consumers will consider only product 1 only if they never see an ad for product
2. Each time the consumer browses a page in content topic 1 this would happen with
probability ϑ. Thus a ϑN fraction of sb1 will only consider product 1.
• sb2: Similarly, a (1 − ϑ)N fraction of these consumers will never see ad 2 and consider
only product 1.
• sbb: Similarly, a (1−ϑ)NϑN fraction of these consumers will never see ad 2 and consider
only product 1. These consumer only see ad 1 while browsing the N content pages in
topic 1 and the N pages in topic 2.
• s21, s22 and s2b will never consider product 1.
Note that sb1 = sb2. Summing the above terms, we obtain the stated expression for
Sc. Among the consumers who consume the outside media,
1−αp
2
of them will only consider
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product 1.
We obtain the expression for Πd by plugging in s11, s1b, s12, sb2 and sbb as detailed in
Section 3. Taking derivative with respect to ρ:
dΠd
ρ
=γ(4 max{αp, αc} − 3αc − 3αp + 2ϑ− 8 max{αp, αc}ϑ+ 3αcαp + 6αcϑ+ 6αpϑ+
6 max{αp, αc}ϑ2 − 6αcϑ2 − 6αpϑ2 − 6αcαpϑ+ 6αcαpϑ2 − 1)/4
The profit function is increasing in ρ when dΠd
ρ
> 0. Solving the inequality gives the condition
specified in Lemma 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 1: The extended envy-free equilibrium defines a function p() :
{{1}, {2}, {1, 2}} → R that assigns a price to any subset of content topics and a content
topic allocation, such that no firm has any incentives to deviate given the current allocation
and prices. We always restrict p∗({1, 2}) = p∗({1}) + p∗({2}). This captures the important
institutional detail that most contextual advertising intermediaries do not use combinatoric
auctions. Deviation is defined as obtaining a content topic that is not won by this firm in
the current allocation, or giving up a content topic that is won by this firm in the current
allocation.
First, observe that due to symmetry, there are three possible types of outcomes: (1)
One advertiser wins both content topics; (2) each advertiser wins her more relevant content
topic; (3) each advertiser wins her less relevant content topic. We rule out case (3) based on
the fact that it is always Pareto dominated by case (2). Note that we do not consider the
case where one content topic is not sold. Since in a two-bidder two-item auction with positive
valuations, both content topics will always be sold in equilibrium. Put differently, when we
evaluate the ‘envy-free’ conditions, we assume that if an advertiser gives up a content topic,
that content topic will be automatically acquired by the other advertiser.
The firms’ profits when each firm advertises through its more relevant content topic
Πd. When one firm advertises through both content topics, the profits are asymmetric. The
firm which advertises through both content topics makes a profit of Πm = γ(s11 + s12 + s1b +
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sbb + 2sb1) + (1− γ)1−αp2 . This can be seen from the fact that all the consumers who browse
online content will receive product 1’s ad. The firm which advertises only through the outside
media makes a profit of Π0 = γΠm (Narasimhan (1988)).
We first provide envy-free conditions for case (1) to be an equilibrium. In equilibrium,
each advertiser wins the more relevant content topic. The envy-free conditions entail:
Πm − p∗({1, 2}) ≤ Πd − p∗({i}), and Πd − p∗({i}) > Π0, for i = 1, 2 (4)
The first inequality in (4) states that each firm does not outbid its competitor for the less
relevant content topic, in which case the firm will win both content topics and monopolize
the market (making a profit Πm). The second inequality in (4) states that each firm does not
prefer to give up the more relevant content and stays out of the market. Thus, we obtain that
Πm − Πd ≤ p∗({i}) ≤ Πd − Π0, i = 1, 2.
When case (2) is an equilibrium such that one advertiser wins both content topics:
Πm − p∗({1, 2}) ≥ Π0, Πm − p∗({1, 2}) ≤ Π0, and p∗({i}) ≥ Πd − Π0, for i = 1, 2 (5)
The first inequality in (5) states that firm 1 doesn’t give up both content topics and exit the
market. The second inequality in (5) states that firm 2 has no incentives to outbid firm 1
and win both content topics. These two conditions, collectively, imply p∗({1, 2}) = Πm −Π0.
In particular, p∗({1}) = Πm − Πd and p∗({2}) = Πd − Π0 is an equilibrium. Clearly, case
(1) and (2) represent mutually exclusive conditions. Thus, each equilibrium is also unique
when it exists. In each case, the intermediary profit equals to p∗({1, 2}), which corresponds
to 2(Πm−Πd) if each firm wins one content topic and Πm−Π0 if one firm wins both content
topics. 2
Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1: From Proposition 1, the intermediary
profit is Rd = 2(Πm − Πd) when Πm + Πo < 2Πd and Rm = Πm − Πo when Πm + Πo ≥ 2Πd.
Combining the two conditions, we obtain R = min(2(Πm − Πd),Πm − Πo). Since Πm − Πo
does not depend on the choice of ϑ, arg maxϑR = arg maxϑ(−Πd). From Lemma 1, we have
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−Πd|ϑ= 1
2
< −Πd|ϑ=1 iff s12−sb1− s112N − s122N − s1b4N + 2sb12N + sbb4N < 0. Thus the threshold conditions
provided in Proposition 2 are necessary for ϑ∗ = 1 or ϑ∗ = 1
2
.
To further establish that the threshold condition is sufficient, we need to rule out the
possibility of any interior solution ϑ∗ ∈ [1
2
, 1]. This can be established in several steps. First,
observe that
∂ − Πd
∂ϑ
= N((sb1−s11)(1−ϑ)(N−1)+ϑ(N−1)(s12−sb1)+(2ϑ−1)ϑ(N−1)(1−ϑ)(N−1)(sbb−ss1b)).
The derivative is always smaller than zero for ϑ = 1
2
. Three cases are possible:
• sb1−s11 < 0 and s12−sb1 < 0. In this case, (sb1−s11)(1−ϑ)(N−1)+ϑ(N−1)(s12−sb1) < 0
for ϑ ∈ [1
2
, 1].
• sb1 − s11 < 0, s12 − sb1 > 0 and |sb1 − s11| > |s12 − sb1|. In this case, (sb1 − s11)(1 −
ϑ)(N − 1) + ϑ(N − 1)(s12 − sb1) is strictly increasing.
• sb1 − s11 > 0, s12 − sb1 < 0 and |sb1 − s11| < |s12 − sb1|. In this case, (sb1 − s11)(1 −
ϑ)(N − 1) + ϑ(N − 1)(s12 − sb1) is strictly decreasing.
For an interior solution to exist, ∂−Πd
∂ϑ
has to cross zero at least twice. Since it is a continuous
function, the first extremum is a minimum and the second extremum is a maximum. Thus,
∂−Πd
∂ϑ
has to be (1) first increasing then decreasing for ϑ > 1
2
. (2) be greater than zero for at
least some ϑ. Given the first and third case above, (2ϑ− 1)ϑ(N − 1)(1− ϑ)(N − 1)(sbb − s1b)
has to be first increasing then decreasing in ϑ. This implies sbb > ss1b. Since the coefficient
of (2ϑ− 1)ϑ(N − 1)(1− ϑ)(N − 1) is positive, we can establish the following upper bound for
∂−Πd
∂ϑ
in the first and third case:
∂ − Πd
∂ϑ
<
{
Nϑ2(sb1 − s11 + s12 − sb1 + sbb − ss1b) sb1 − s11 > 0
N(1− ϑ)2(sb1 − s11 + s12 − sb1 + sbb − ss1b) s12 − sb1 < 0
Thus, a necessary condition for ∂−Πd
∂ϑ
> 0 for at least some ϑ is sb1−s11+s12−sb1+sbb−s1b > 0.
However, this condition is sufficient for the topic shelving outcome to take place. Therefore,
there is no interior solution ϑ∗ that does not induce topic shelving. Similarly, in the second
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case, no shelving implies sb1− s11 + s12− sb1 + sbb− s1b < 0, which implies (1−ϑ)N(sb1− s11 +
sbb − s1b) < 0. This is a sufficient condition for the first derivative to be strictly increasing
over ϑ ∈ [1
2
, 1], hence, an interior extremum does not exist. To summarize, we conclude that
when keyword shelving does not take place at ϑ∗, ϑ∗ must not be an interior solution. 2
Proof of Corrolary 2: Using the expressions provided in Proposition 1, it is clearly
that intermediary revenue increasing in ρ in the first and decreasing in the second case. 2
Proof of Proposition 3: We start by examining the possible outcomes with respect to
the allocation of the four keywords. Let Πm denote the monopolist’s profit, that is, when one
firm gets all the topics. Let Πh and Πl denote the product market profits of the two players
respectively if the first player get three topics and the second player gets the remaining one
topic. Let Πd denote the duopoly profits when one player gets A1, B1, whereas its competitor
gets A2, B2. Finally, let Πd
′ denote duopoly profits when one player gets A1, A2, its com-
petitor B1, B2 or when one player gets A1, B2, and its competitor A2, B1. To determine
the equilibrium topic allocations we need to determine the total profits of the two players.
We show that the equilibrium topic allocation will be the one corresponding to the highest
of Πm + 0,Πh + Πl, 2Πd, 2Πd
′. That is, a topic allocation is an equilibrium if it maximizes
total product market profits. To see this, for example, in the case when 2Πd is the highest,
recall that an equilibrium is described by envy-free payment function p∗() defined on the set
of keywords. Consider a potential deviation from the duopoly outcome where player 1 gets
keywords A1, B1. For a deviation that would add keyword A2 to be non-profitable we have
to have p∗({A2}) ≥ Πh − Πd. For the same deviation not to be profitable from player 2’s
perspective we need Πd − Πl ≥ p∗({A2}), leading to Πd − Πl ≥ Πh − Πd, further yielding
2Πd ≥ Πh + Πl. Repeating the above for any possible deviation, we get that total profits have
to be maximized in equilibrium. To determine the allocation that maximizes total profits, let
us rewrite the profits, using the sij formulas. Recall that Πm = s11 + s1b + s12 + 2sb1 + sbb and
Πd = s11 +s1b+sb1. Furthermore, one can derive Πh = s11 +s1b+s12 +sb1, Πl = s11 +s1b, and
Πd
′ = s11 + s1b + s12. Note that Πh + Πl = 2Πd+2Πd
′
2
, that is, the total profits of the three-one
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allocation is always between the two duopoly outcome, therefore it cannot be the maximum.
To examine the remaining three possibilities - whether Πm, 2Πd, or 2Πd
′ is the maximal, we
need to plug in the sij expressions. Straightforward calculations give the stated results. 2
Proof of Corrolary 3: Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, we can give a lower
bound on the sum of prices that will be paid for each topic in equilibrium. As before in the
monopoly case this will be Πm, but here it is the total minimum revenue for all four (not
only two) topics. In the basic duopoly case, the total payment for A1 plus B1 will be at least
Πm−Πd, which is the same as for A2 plus B2. Following the exact same logic in the duopoly
shelving case the total for A1 plus A2, as well as for B1 plus B2 will be Πm −Πd′. Although
this way we can determine the minimum total revenue for a combination of keywords, there
are multiple solution in terms of the distribution between the individual keywords. With
the exception of the last, duopoly shelving case, we need to rely on the assumption that
the two intermediaries have identical revenues due to their symmetric setup. Therefore, the
minimum individual symmetric equilibrium revenues will be Rm = Πm
2
, Rd = Πm − Πd, and
Rd
′
= Πm−Πd′. Plugging in the formulas for sij, it is clear that in the first two cases revenues
are the same as in Proposition 1, whereas in the last case the revenues are weakly lower as
this configuration is an equilibrium only if Πd
′ ≥ Πd. 2
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